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Abstract: This paper provides a qualified defense of Martin Heidegger’s controversial 
assertion that humans and animals differ in kind, not just degree.  He has good reasons to 
defend the human difference, and his thesis is compatible with the evolution of humans from 
other animals.  He argues that the human environment is the world of meaning and truth, an 
environment which peculiarly makes possible truthful activities such as biology.  But the 
ability to be open to truth cannot be a feature of human biology, without making such pursuits 
as biology, mathematics, and philosophy a biological function of a certain species, homo 
sapiens.  To deny the human difference amounts to species relativism which leaves the 
normativity of truth unexplained.  To reconcile the human evolutionary heritage and the 
uniquely human openness to meaning and truth, the paper amplifies a distinction occasionally 
made by Heidegger between condition and cause. 
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In 1859, Charles Darwin entitled the third chapter of the Origin of Species, “The 
Struggle for Existence” (1952a: 32).  A year later, it was translated into German as “Kampf 
ums Dasein” (Krell 1993: 48).  Every single species, humans included, emerged from natural 
selection.  In The Descent of Man, Darwin argued that humans differ in degree, not in kind, 
from other animals: “Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and the higher 
animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind” (1952b: 319).  In the animal 
kingdom, there is a gradient of rationality, language, religion, and handicraft; human beings 
are just another grade of the continuum.
1
  In the 1920s, Martin Heidegger gave the German 
term, “Dasein,” a markedly different sense.  Instead of naming generic existence, it designates 
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 Regarding religion, Darwin sets aside the kind of views of the divine one may have from revelation and 
from philosophical speculation.  He then suggests that the natural religious sentiment shared by all humankind can 
be found in some higher animals: “…we see some distant approach to this state of mind in the deep love of a dog for 
his master, associated with complete submission, some fear, and perhaps other feelings” (1952b: 303). 
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the entity that each of us is, an entity distinct from other kinds of entities in that it is open to 
the intelligibility or meaning of all entities.  We who partake in Dasein can “apprehend 
something as a being” (GA 29/30: 384/264).  Throughout his works, Heidegger repeatedly 
says that Dasein is separated from all animals by “an abyss,” and he even denies that the 
human body is an organism (GA 9: 324/247).  There is no continuum embracing animals and 
humans; rather there is a difference in kind.  With this position, he seems to deny Darwin’s 
insight that human beings have evolved from other life forms. 
 Heidegger’s position seems shocking, even to some in the continental tradition.  
Calarco (2008) accuses Heidegger of “metaphysical anthropocentrism,” and Mitchell (2011: 
74-85) holds that childhood development undermines the human difference.  Other 
philosophers are just as scandalized.  MacIntyre (1999: 47-48) finds Heidegger’s difference in 
kind refuted by research on the higher animals, such as dolphins and chimpanzees; he thinks 
erasing the difference leads to a greater awareness of our animal vulnerability and consequent 
need for the virtues.  Searle (2005: 329) holds that Heidegger’s account of Dasein lacks 
credibility, because among other things he does not relate Dasein to evolutionary theory.   
I think these objections are misguided.  Heidegger has good reason to defend the 
human difference, and his thesis is compatible with the evolution of humans from other 
animals.  In this paper, I first trace his reasoning.  His position rests on an informed 
understanding of biology that finds confirmation in the recent biological theory of niche 
construction.  Environments exist only when their corresponding organisms exist, because the 
biology of the organism specifies which features of the physical world will constitute the 
organism’s environment.  His contention that humans differ from other animals stems from 
his belief that the human environment must differ in kind from the environment of other 
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animals.  He argues that the human environment is the world of language and truth, an 
environment which peculiarly makes possible truthful activities such as biology.  But the 
ability to be open to truth cannot be a feature of human biology, without making such pursuits 
as biology, mathematics, and philosophy a biological function of a certain species, homo 
sapiens.  To deny the human difference amounts to species relativism and leaves the 
normativity of truth unexplained.  To reconcile Heidegger’s thesis concerning human 
uniqueness with the Darwinian insight into common ancestry, I amplify a distinction 
occasionally made by Heidegger between condition and cause.   
It is trivially true to say that human beings differ in kind from other animals when 
“kind” is taken as synonymous with biological species.  Obviously and uninterestingly homo 
sapiens is different from goldfish and magpies.  It is also trivially true to say that the 
difference between homo sapiens and other living primates is great, such that there is an 
observable gap in behavior and abilities.  The question concerns not whether there is a 
difference but rather the character of the difference.  Is what is distinctively human, i.e., 
openness to truth, intelligible according to biological principles?  Or does it require a different 
mode of inquiry to make sense of it?  Heidegger thinks that when it comes to humans as 
Dasein, biology can make no sense of us; instead, it falls to philosophy to render intelligible 
our unique openness to truth in which something like biological inquiry is possible.  I am not 
interested in mounting a general case for the human difference in kind.  Rather, I want to 
show that the criticism leveled against Heidegger’s position is unconvincing.  And the crux of 
the issue, for him, is that with Dasein comes a new domain, a dimensional difference, which 
calls for its own principles of analysis.  Specifically, Dasein alone relates to being or 
intelligibility.  And this domain is normative; it makes demands on us to get things right.   
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1.  The Reciprocity of Niche Construction 
Darwin’s metaphor of adaptation suggests that the animal must fit itself to a pre-
existing environment.  Heidegger follows the biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1921) and 
maintains that environments are in fact a function of the kind of organism in question: “The 
organism is not something independent in its own right which then adapts itself.  On the 
contrary, the organism adapts a particular environment into it in each case, so to speak” (GA 
29/30: 384/264).
2
  That is, different kinds of organisms establish quite different environments; 
they do not first exist and then conform to an environment.  This criticism of Darwin’s 
metaphor expresses a fundamental principle: animal and environment are related reciprocally.   
Heidegger’s principle of reciprocity, inspired by Uexküll, finds support in the 
contemporary model of niche construction, advocated by biologists Richard Lewontin (2000), 
F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin Ladland, and Marcus Feldman (2003).
3
  According to this 
theory, the organism in fact constructs its environment by determining which features of the 
physical world are relevant to it and by changing the physical world itself (Lewontin 2000: 
41-68).  As Lewontin puts it:  
Just as there can be no organism without an environment, so there can be no 
environment without an organism.  There is a confusion between the correct assertion 
that there is a physical world outside of an organism that would continue to exist in the 
absence of the species, and the incorrect claim that environments exist without species.  
The earth will precess on its axis and produce periodic glacial and interglacial ages, 
volcanoes will erupt, evaporation from oceans will result in rain and snow, independent 
of any living beings.  But glacial streams, volcanic ash deposits, and pools of water are 
not environments.  They are physical conditions from which environments may be built.  
An environment is something that surrounds or encircles, but for there to be a 
surrounding there must be something at the center to be surrounded.  The environment of 
2
 For the same claim, see Heidegger, GA 36/37: 210/160. 
3
 See also the special issue, “Human Niche Construction,” ed. Jeremy R. Kendal, Jamshid J. Tehrani and 
John Odling-Smee, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 366 (2011).   
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an organism is the penumbra of external conditions that are relevant to it because it has 
effective interactions with those aspects of the outer world. (2000: 49) 
 
Because the number of potential environments is unlimited, it is not the environment that 
selects the organism so much as the organism that selects the environment.  The nature of the 
organism determines which environment will be relevant for it.  Lewontin (1991: 8-9) argues 
that as helpful as the Darwinian metaphors of adaptation and struggle for existence were in his 
day, they need to be modified today in favor of more complex understanding of the relation of 
organism and environment.  Now, the metaphor of construction might appear just as unilateral 
as the metaphor of adaptation, but Lewontin (2000: 126) points out that the environment does 
affect the organism as well: “Thus organism and environment are both causes and effects in a 
coevolutionary process.”4  There is substantial agreement between Heidegger and Lewontin 
concerning the lack of reciprocity in Darwin’s adaptation metaphor. 
  
2.  Constructing the Human Niche 
What is the environmental niche that opens up with the human being?  In The 
Symbolic Species, the anthropologist Terrence Deacon (1997: 22) writes: “Though we share 
the same earth with millions of kinds of living creatures, we also live in a world that no other 
species has access to.” In this world, we can range over absent things, including non-existent 
things, and consider the way things could have gone better.  “In a real sense, we live our lives 
in this shared virtual world” (23).  Heidegger agrees that humans uniquely relate to symbolic 
meaning, which is the domain of being, truth, and language.  But he insists that we cannot 
understand this domain in terms of the interplay of biological and physical forces.   He does 
4
 Odling-Smee et al (2003: 19) express the reciprocity as follows: “From the beginning of life, all 
organisms have, in part, modified their selective environments, and their ability to do so was, in part, a consequence 
of their naturally selected genes.”  
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not wish to deny, of course, that we can analyze the human environment biologically.  For 
example, we can point out that one of the significant things determined by our DNA is our 
relative size, which makes us immune to the Brownian motion that batters bacteria and makes 
us big enough to feel the effects of gravity, big enough to generate sufficient kinetic energy to 
drive a spear into a wooly mammoth (Lewontin 1991: 91).  However, merely being of a 
certain size and relating to certain physical forces relevant for specifying our means for 
survival is not yet what Heidegger means by world.  Although the theory of niche 
construction brings a more dynamic understanding of the relation of the animal and the 
environment, it is inadequate as a characterization of world.  For what is at issue is not an 
ontic or causal relation that supports the survival of the human being, but instead openness to 
truth, which shows itself only to ontological investigation.  Despite this difference, Heidegger 
employs the following analogy: as animal is to environment, so Dasein is to world.  The 
analogy is fraught with danger, for it might be taken to suggest that in some way the 
ontological can be explained in terms of the ontic, that somehow world admits of a biological 
explanation.  But the analogy serves to heighten the reciprocity of the ontic and ontological 
relations, not to marginalize the difference between them.   
As the animal is correlated with a particular domain termed an environment, so the 
human is correlated with a particular domain termed world.  In 1919, Heidegger speaks of the 
human environment as the world of interpersonal meaning: 
In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out of an 
immediate environment [Umwelt].  This environmental milieu (lectern, book, 
blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-car, 
etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as meaning this 
and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any 
mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension.  Living in an environment, it 
signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character of world. GA 
56/57: 72-73/61) 
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In Being and Time (1927), he calls attention to the uniqueness of this human environment.  
After provisionally exhibiting world, Heidegger notes that it is the condition for the 
possibility of truth.  Dasein, as that entity characterized by being-in-the-world, provides the 
site for things to appear in their truth: 
Newton’s laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever—these are true only 
as long as Dasein is.  Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there 
be any after Dasein is no more.  For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, 
and uncoveredness, cannot be.  … 
 To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify 
that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by 
those laws.  Through Newton the laws became true and with them, entities became 
accessible in themselves to Dasein.  Once entities have been uncovered, they show 
themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were.  Such uncovering is 
the kind of Being which belongs to ‘truth’. (Sein und Zeit: 227/269) 
  
Dasein’s environment, world, allows entities to be available in their meaning and truth.  
Absent Dasein, this environment would not exist, even though the entities in it would.  As 
Carman (2003: 155-203) argues, Heidegger advocates a realism about entities and their causal 
properties, which are as they are independent of Dasein.  Heidegger does, however, think that 
being, intelligibility, truth, and meaning are dependent on Dasein.  In this sense, Dasein 
constructs its niche, although the niche also determines what it is to be Dasein.  The principle 
of reciprocity, then, applies to the human being as Dasein, who provides the place for things 
to appear in truth.   
 Heidegger thinks classical philosophy sees the connection of Dasein and being quite 
clearly.  Plato maintains that to be human, a soul it must have seen being (GA 36/37: 
206/157).  Aristotle thinks the human soul is “in a way all entities,” and Thomas Aquinas 
understands transcendental truth as rooted horizontally in the capacity of the human intellect 
to apprehend all things (Sein und Zeit: 14/34).  Dasein’s special status, Heidegger concludes, 
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“has obviously nothing in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of entities” 
(Sein und Zeit: 14/34).  The reciprocity of being and Dasein, then, is not a residue of modern 
idealism.  It concerns the classical insight that being or meaning is correlated with mind.  
Heidegger does maintain that the tradition has two critical shortcomings: it fails to identify 
world as the place in which the correlation occurs, and it does not experience the dynamic 
reciprocity inherent in the connection of Dasein and being (Engelland 2012).  As Darwin 
misses the reciprocity of animal and environment, so the transcendental tradition misses the 
“remarkable ‘relatedness’ backward or forward” concerning Dasein and being (Sein und Zeit: 
8/28).  To make sense of this relatedness, Heidegger comes to underscore that world is a 
fundamentally historical phenomenon in which our conception of intelligibility changes from 
era to era.  For example, he thinks that the contemporary Western world relates to nature in a 
very different way than the ancient Greeks.  Indeed, Heidegger even goes so far as to say that 
the contemporary world suffers a kind of darkening, which, among other things, offers up 
nature as raw material for industrial exploitation rather than as fodder for poetry and 
contemplation (GA 40: 34/47).  The specifics of these historical claims are no-doubt 
controversial, but the general idea that different human cultures and ages afford a different 
horizon for philosophical thought need not be.  Nonetheless, if Heidegger’s later historical 
meditations seem unappealing, his account of world and the human difference can still be 
maintained on the basis of his earlier, purely transcendental conception of world.   
 
3.  A Difference in Kind 
The human environment is the domain of language and truth.  Whether there is a 
difference in kind turns on the question of the relation of Dasein’s world to the environments of 
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other animals.  Searle (2005: 329-333) finds problematic Heidegger’s claim that the 
“transcendental operator” is more basic that the brute facts discovered by science.  But if we 
follow the suggestion of Lewontin that there is no niche apart from the organism that constructs 
the environment, we can see what Heidegger has in mind.  Things would indeed exist without 
Dasein, but they could not manifest themselves in their intelligibility.  Dasein’s environment 
differs in kind from other living things, because it allows things to show themselves as they are 
and not just in terms of biological relevance.  Dasein taps in to the normative dimension of truth.  
Our unique nature helps construct the peculiar environment in which there can be truthful 
activities such as biology.  
The phenomenological movement began with Husserl’s refutation of psychologism 
(1900/2000) and discovery of intentionality (1901/2000).  Truth cannot be explained in terms of 
psychology, for psychology itself presupposes it.  To maintain otherwise is to fall prey to the 
absurdity of relativism.  Husserl (1913/1998: 111) discovers “a veritable abyss [Abgrund]” 
between constituting and constituted, with the result that the human becomes bifurcated into a 
transcendental and empirical ego.  Heidegger never abandons Husserl’s refutation of 
psychologism, although he does find problematic the ideal-real divide Husserl outlined as the 
alternative (Sein und Zeit: 215-217/258-260).  Heidegger takes Husserl to task for not realizing 
that the discovering of intentionality and with it categorial intuition involves a new awareness of 
what it means to be human: “The insight into intentionality does not go far enough to see that 
grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept 
of the human being” (GA 26: 167/133).  To be human means to be open to the availability of 
things in their intelligibility (Crowell 2002).  If we deny that Dasein differs in kind from other 
things, then we fall prey to a kind of relativism which defines truth as the attribute of a given 
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species.
5
  Instead, Heidegger insists that it is the peculiarity of Dasein that it is the steward of 
intelligibility, and it is this not qua being-in-an-environment but qua being-in-the-world.  
Heidegger attempts to think of the human being, intentionality and all, as a single being that 
therefore retains an abyss in relation to other living beings.   
Now, it might appear that Heidegger’s appeal to a transcendental operator, Dasein, itself 
falls prey to relativism.  He addresses this in the 1927 text, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
by clearly distinguishing the meaning of something unveiled or made true from its uncovering or 
being made true:  
For nature to be as it is, it does not need truth, unveiledness.  The content intended in the 
true proposition ‘2 times 2 = 4’ can subsist through all eternity without there existing any 
truth about it.  So far as there is a truth about it, this truth understands precisely that 
nothing in what it means depends on it for being what it is. (GA 24: 315/220-221) 
   
For Heidegger, there are no eternal truths, because, on his view, there is no eternal intellect for 
whom such truths could be true.  However, the content, 2 + 2 = 4, shows itself to us as existing 
independent of its being taken to be true.  Dasein can access meaning that transcends the fact of 
its being accessed, but only Dasein allows that meaning to be true or normative.  As Steven 
Crowell has argued, Heidegger’s Being and Time develops a comprehensive account of 
normativity.  Unlike Christina Korsgaard’s Kantian conception, which appends self-reflection to 
animal inclinations, Heidegger’s conception is rooted in the unitary phenomenon of care.  Angst, 
guilt, and a certain anticipation of death, provide the existential framework for making sense of 
the normativity of truth.  Dasein, thrown into the world, finds itself beholden to the entities it 
finds there.  As Crowell (2013: 240) puts it: “This does not mean that entities depend on Dasein.  
But their ‘being’ — that is, any characterization of them as something — is possible only if 
Dasein holds them up to constitutive standards, or satisfaction conditions, for being the things 
5
 “The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and certainly before 
any biology.” Sein und Zeit: 45/71; cf. Sein und Zeit: 11/31.  On this point, see Husserl (2000: §§ 36 and 38). 
11 
 
they are.”  Dasein peculiarly allows entities in the world to be intelligible as the things they are 
such that the intelligibility of things is normative.  Such normativity makes no sense if openness 
to truth is regarded as a biological function along the lines of metabolism and reproduction. 
Nietzsche provides a good foil to Heidegger, for he too recognizes the dependency of 
truth on the human being.  However, he follows Darwin in denying the human difference.  
Hence, he concludes that truth and knowledge is of only relative standing: 
Between ourselves: since no one would maintain that there is any necessity for men to 
exist, reason, as well as Euclidean space, is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of 
animal, and one among many— (1968, n. 515)6  
 
Heidegger agrees that there would be no mathematics and rationality without Dasein, but he 
saves their truth by means of Dasein’s difference in kind.  Such a move is not a metaphysical 
anthropo-centrism but rather fundamentally an onto- or aletheia-centrism (GA 9: 334/254).  
Dasein is different only because being and truth are different.  Because being and truth need 
Dasein but are not an accident of a biological species (and thus relative), Dasein comes to the 
fore, no longer as an organism, but as the agent of truth.
7
  The special character of being and 
truth as the human environment necessitates a difference in kind: “In its essence, language is 
not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing.  Nor can it ever be 
thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, perhaps not even in 
terms of the character of signification.  Language is the clearing-concealing advent of being 
itself” (GA 9: 326/248-249).  Language logically belongs to the concept of truth and world.  
The point is taken up by Gadamer (1998: 438-456), who notes the contrast with Nietzsche.  
McDowell, citing Gadamer’s presentation of the distinction between environment and world, 
6
 My emphasis.  On the importance of Darwin for Nietzsche, see Stegmaier (1987: 264-287). 
7
 I take the phrase, “agent of truth,” from Sokolowski (2008: 14), who writes, “There could not be a 
disclosure without me or someone like me there to achieve and receive it, and I am there not merely as a biological 
organism or a psychological center of consciousness, but as an agent of logic and verification.”   
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argues (1994: 114-119) that the experience of objective reality presupposes the kind of 
conceptual capacities uniquely enjoyed by human beings.  The difference is that McDowell 
views world as a function of the spontaneity of the understanding rather than of language.   
Consider the kinds of principles at work in making sense of the following situation: 
Darwin is at work in his study.  Light streams into his window from the sun some 93 million 
miles away at an exact speed identifiable by physics.  Now, Darwin’s stomach rumbles.  He’s 
hungry.  He may get up and grab a snack if he wishes.  If he doesn’t, he’ll survive, although 
eventually he’ll have to eat to replenish the energy his body needs to metabolize.  He decides to 
wait to eat dinner with his family.  For Darwin as a human being, the felt desire is normative: 
one should fulfill it, although how and why, and even whether it will be is not determined (in 
special circumstances, one might forgo food for one’s child or one’s God).  Now Darwin focuses 
on his work.  He weighs the considerations for and against, and decides that humans differ in 
degree and not in kind from other animals.  In making this judgment, he not only wants to get it 
right, but he should get it right, even though getting it wrong will not imperil his survival.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to get it wrong.  Unlike the physical domain in which laws are 
infallibly followed or the biological realm of necessity, the normativity of truth is not inviolable.  
If an engineer makes a miscalculation, a bridge collapses; if an animal does not eat, it will die; 
but if a scholar misunderstands his topic, a different sort of thing happens.  When the error is 
pointed out to him, he will change his mind because, as Dasein, he has care for the truth.  
Openness to truth is not the sort of thing that admits of biological explanation.   
 
4.  The Theoretical and Empirical Questions 
It is helpful to distinguish two interrelated questions: 
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First, there is the theoretical question: Is openness to truth intelligible in biological 
terms?  If yes, the manifest differences in behaviors and capacities between humans and other 
animals is a difference in degree, not a difference in kind.  If no, the manifest difference 
reflects a difference that can only be registered by philosophy (not by a biologist qua biologist 
but only a biologist qua philosopher).  As I argued above, it is necessary to answer no in order 
to avoid relativism and make the normativity of truth intelligible. 
Second, there is a separate empirical question: Are humans alone open to truth?  
Granting the difference in kind between the entity open to truth, Dasein, and biological 
processes, it is still an open question how many species or members of species partake of 
Dasein.  Heidegger’s case for the first question is extremely strong, and it can be because it is 
a purely theoretical issue.  The case for the second is not only theoretical but also empirical.  
It is still a strong case, but as a hybrid one it is necessarily open to revision.  Heidegger asserts 
what could be called the singularity thesis: humans alone are open to truth.  Clever though 
they may be, dolphins, dogs, and chimpanzees lack language and are therefore doing 
something other than what Dasein does.  Heidegger also underscores the historical character 
of world that happens thanks to language.  Hence, species without language are species 
without historical openness to truth.   
By calling this second question, “empirical,” I do not mean it is a position remanded to 
the special sciences, but rather it is a question that requires cooperation among philosophy and 
the sciences to answer.  We know about our environment because each of us is a Dasein who 
dwells in it.  “…all man’s questioning about man is in the first and last instance a matter of 
the existence of man in each specific case” (GA 29/30: 407/281).  Philosophical method 
allows us to conceptualize the human way of being.  In Being and Time and contemporary 
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lecture courses, he calls this method “formal indication” (Dahlstrom 1994 and Shockey 2010).  
Terms such as “care” or “being-in-the-world” are invitations for each of us to turn to our own 
environments and register the distinctions that show up there.  Formal indication, however, is 
not available for investigating other kinds of beings.  How do we know what it’s like to be a 
non-human animal?  How can we discern its environment?   
In the 1929/30 lecture course, Heidegger puzzles long and hard concerning the 
question how we can access the experiential life of animals to discover what concepts if any 
might be operative.  He thinks we know about Dasein by thoughtfully being one, and we 
know about other animals by a form of analogical reasoning based on our own environmental 
experience and on empirical investigation (McNeill 1999: 211-220).  On the basis of this 
approach, he advances his famous thesis that in comparison with Dasein, animals are poor in 
world (GA 29/30: 263/177).  Animals are bound to their respective environments and cannot 
apprehend something as something: 
For it is not simply a question of a qualitative otherness of the animal world as 
compared with the human world, and especially not a question of quantitative 
distinctions in range, depth, and breadth—not a question of whether or how the animal 
takes what is given to it in a different way, but rather of whether the animal can 
apprehend something as something, something as a being, at all.  If it cannot, then the 
animal is separated from man by an abyss. (GA 29/30: 383-384/264) 
 
Animals access an environment with beings, but only Dasein can experience those beings as 
beings.  A dog might sniff a leaf lying in the grass, but Dasein understands the leaf to be a 
part of the tree that, among other things, carries out photosynthesis, and the falling of which 
signals the change of seasons.  “The animal certainly has access to … and indeed to 
something that actually is.  But this is something that only we are capable of experiencing and 
having manifest as beings” (GA 29/30: 390/269).  Animals are captivated by the disinhibition 
of their drives.  The character of the surroundings they find themselves within are specified by 
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the panoply of drives, and their behavior is specified in terms of the release of these drives.  
Features of the environment show up only in the ambit of the captivated animal interest (GA 
29/30: 376-378/258-260).  By contrast, the human world allows entities to be encountered in 
their intelligibility, as the sorts of things they are.  It is important to note that he does not 
regard animal essence as poor in itself but only in comparison with Dasein (GA 29/30: 
394/271).   
Heidegger also focuses on language in order to settle the empirical question.  
Language constitutes Dasein’s openness to truth.  The claim that animals lack world can be 
justified in terms of their lack of language: “Because plants and animals are lodged in their 
respective environments but are never placed freely into the clearing of being which alone is 
‘world,’ they lack language” GA 9: 326/248-249).  Hence I think Heidegger can agree with 
the central idea of Deacon (1997: 22): “My extravagant claim to know what other species 
cannot know rests on evidence that symbolic thought does not come innately built in, but 
develops by internalizing the symbolic process that underlies language.  So species that have 
not acquired the ability to communicate symbolically cannot have acquired the ability to think 
this way either.”  Similarly, Davidson (2001: 95) thinks propositional attitudes exceed a 
merely animal way of being: “This raises the question how to tell when a creature has 
propositional attitudes; snails, we may agree, do not, but how about dogs or chimpanzees?  
The question is not entirely empirical, for there is the philosophical question what evidence is 
relevant to deciding when a creature has propositional attitudes.”  He thinks we are justified in 
attributing reason to humans alone because humans alone have language (2001: 96n1).  That 
language reveals world openness, or at least an attribute uniquely human, is a position that 
enjoys a following among some scientists and notable philosophers.   
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Mitchell calls our attention to a passage from 1928-29 in which Heidegger discusses 
the ontogeny of Dasein.  As Mitchell notes, Heidegger approaches both animals and infants 
privatively, by beginning with mature Dasein (GA 27: 123).  The baby is in a “dim state,” 
(Dämmerzustand) interested chiefly in sleep, food, and warmth.  When Dasein is in this state, 
entities cannot quite show themselves as such: 
The dim state in which such an early life is does not mean that there is no relation to 
entities, but only that this relating of oneself to ... has no specific aim.  The being near 
entities is still clouded to some extent, still not cleared, so that this Dasein can make 
no determinate use of entities, near which it always is by its very essence. (GA 27: 
126)  
 
Mitchell (2011: 84) thinks Heidegger here compromises his claim that Dasein differs from 
animals, because he recognizes degrees to Dasein: “The category that is supposed to be 
preserved against contamination by an animal other … is already compromised. Not all 
humans are alike.”  However, there is no contradiction in maintaining both of the following:  
(1) There is a difference in kind between the animal, tied to an environment, and the 
human infant, destined for world. 
 
(2) There is no difference in kind between the infant, not yet matured, and the child 
who has matured.   
 
The first proposition sorts kinds of species based on the kind of environment they typically 
access in their adult form.  The second sensibly maintains that developmental stages within a 
species do not constitute different species; therefore, developmental stages cannot constitute a 
different kind of species.  In this way, it is not correct to say that Heidegger has 
“contaminated” his categories.  Additionally, some research supports the view that preverbal 
infants can do something chimpanzees cannot: communicate about absent things (Liszkowski 
et al 2009: 654-660).  Also, unlike dogs and chimpanzees, human children teach themselves 
to speak through eavesdropping, not training (Bloom 2000).  Philosophically, we can say that 
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infants are destined for language because of the kind of being that they are (Engelland 2014).  
Ontogeny may be analogous to phylogeny, but there is the important difference: ontogeny is 
seamless, concerning a single being, while phylogeny concerns a sequence of numerically 
distinct beings.  This means that there is no place within ontogeny for the advent of a 
difference in kind, but there is a place within phylogeny for just such a difference. 
While the very idea of a difference in kind seems undermined by the fact of common 
ancestry, Heidegger suggests an analogy to make it more palatable.  Any animal, even the 
simplest, differs in kind from a rock, for the animal has an environment.  The transition from 
non-life to life is not a continuum but a difference in kind.  Analogously, the transition from 
environment to world is not a continuum but a difference in kind.  The linguists Derek 
Bickerton (2009: 9) and Michael Corballis (2011: 180) provide another analogy.  Though we 
can point to intermediary forms between aquatic insects and flying insects, the break between 
them is undeniable: either a given species can fly or it cannot.  Both think such a difference is 
compatible with ordinary evolutionary processes.  Even Aristotle, who canonically 
distinguishes ontological gulfs in nature (non-living to living, living to perceiving, perceiving 
to understanding), recognizes the presence of intermediate forms.
8
  We can see that certain 
molecules, say, are intermediate between chemistry and biology without compromising the 
fundamental difference between non-living beings and living ones, because the meaning of 
the part is determined by the whole of which it is a part.  The recognition that some animals, 
e.g., dogs, chimpanzees, and dolphins, are closer to Dasein than other animals does not 
undermine the difference in kind between Dasein and animality.  A number of scientists, 
while not questioning the evolutionary continuum, nonetheless do not hesitate to identify a 
8
 Aristotle, History of Animals, VIII.1. 
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“gap” between humans and other animals in three areas: behavior, mind, and language.9  
Philosophical methodology, attentive to the theme of truth and knowledge, can say more: 
there is indeed a difference in kind between humans and other animals, because there is a 
difference in kind between environment and world, language is essential to world, and even 
the higher animals do not have language.  Biologically, there is a gap in the continuum; 
philosophically, there is no continuum at all. 
 
5.  The Principle of Wholism 
Supposing there is a difference in kind between environment and world, why does 
Heidegger locate the difference between animals and Dasein rather than locate the difference 
within human nature between animality and rationality?  Heidegger (GA 26: 212/166) briefly 
flirts with dualism according to which the human body is part of nature while Dasein 
transcends nature, but his considered view is that openness to being defines Dasein as a 
whole, the body included.  Subscribing to the principle of wholism, Heidegger says that the 
human body is what it is because of openness to being. 
In 1929, he expresses the principle as follows: “Wholeness means that the organism is 
not an aggregate, composed of elements or parts, but that the growth and the construction of 
the organism is governed by this wholeness in each and every stage” (GA 29/30: 380/261).  
The wholeness of a living being, then, is not the sum of the parts but is instead the governing 
principle of the parts.  The irreducibility of the whole stands in contrast to the “the 
increasingly powerful, purely analytical method in morphology and physiology” that regards 
the whole as an aggregate of parts: 
9
 [a] Behavior: Tomasello (2009) and Kappeler and Silk (2010); [b] Mind: Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli 
(2008); [c] Language: Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002), Bickerton (2009), and Deacon (1997). 
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In accordance with this method it was believed—and in part is still believed today—
that we can build up the organism through recourse to its elementary constituents 
without first having grasped the building plan, i.e., the essence of the organism, in its 
fundamental structure and without keeping this structure in view as that which guides 
the construction.  (GA 29/30: 378-379/260)  
 
Heidegger equally rejects vitalism, the view that some immaterial force accounts for an 
organism, and he thinks that the whole is the part’s reason for being (GA 29/30: 278/189).   
 Twenty years later, Heidegger returns to this theme in the 1949 Bremen Lectures.  The 
part-whole relationship of a machine and a living being differ in essential respects.  He terms 
the former, “piece” (das Stück), and the latter, “part” (der Teil).  A piece is uniform and 
replaceable, but a part participates in the whole.  “The part joins, with other parts, into the 
whole.  It takes part in the whole, belongs to it.  The piece on the other hand is separate and, 
as what it is, is sectioned off against other pieces” (GA 79a: 36/276).  Pieces do not 
participate in the whole and so can be exchanged at will, but parts belong to the whole.  
Heidegger presents his own hand as an example of a part: “…my hand is not a piece of me.  I 
myself am completely in each respective gesture of the hand” (GA 79a: 37/276).  According 
to wholism, the living being is not a machine composed of pieces.  The whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts, and each part embodies the whole.  While such a view is not widely 
shared in today’s scientific community, Denton et al (2013) argue that wholism or organicism 
may be on the ascendency, due to the failure of the mechanical model to explain the living 
cell.   
Heidegger denies the relevance of the morphological similarities between human 
beings and other primates, because he views the body and its parts in terms of the 
environmental relation: “Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have hands” 
(GA 8: 18/16).  Heidegger understands the hand in terms of the essential human task of 
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disclosedness and language.  “The hand exists as hand only where there is disclosure and 
concealment” (GA 54: 118/80).  Accordingly, we need to look toward language and being, 
not zoological research, for the origin of the hand: “The hand sprang forth only out of the 
word and together with the word” (GA 54: 118-119/80).  Gestures are an important part of 
language, and hands enable us to make things.  Even though the hand has antecedents in the 
fossil record, what it is to be a hand makes sense only in light of Dasein’s unique task of 
disclosing being (GA 8: 18-19/16). 
Do Heidegger’s claims here square with the empirical evidence?  Put in Heidegger’s 
terms, are chimpanzees capable of disclosive gesturing?  Michael Tomasello (2008: 37-38), 
an evolutionary psychologist, maintains that chimpanzees do not gesture disclosively.  They 
will reach out to objects that they want, but they do not do what human infants do, namely 
point to things they find interesting:  
No apes in any kind of environment produce, either for other apes or for humans, acts 
of pointing that serve functions other than the imperative function.  That is, they do 
not point declaratively to simply share interest and attention in something with another 
individual (Gomez 2004), and they do not point informatively to inform another of 
something she might want or need to know—as human infants do from very early in 
ontogeny. 
 
The lack of disclosive gesturing stems from a basic difference between human cooperative 
communication and non-human communication.  In this respect, Rakoczy and Tomasello 
(2007) criticize Searle’s “promiscuous” attribution of collective intentionality to all the social 
animals.  The ape gesture reaches out to the object desired, but it does not disclose it as such 
(Tomasello 2003: 11).   
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6.  Developing the Distinction between Condition and Cause 
Up to this point, I have defended Heidegger’s account.  I would now like to remedy a 
shortcoming.  The oddest part of Heidegger’s account of Dasein is the body.  He admits its 
kinship with animals yet denies that it is an animal body.  He thinks the meaning of the body 
comes from openness to being; handicraft, gesturing, dancing, etc. are what they are due to 
openness to being (GA 8: 18-19/16-17).  But what of the humdrum activity of the internal 
organs and such things as DNA?  Certainly the roles they play are identical to the roles played 
by the parts of many other animals.  How do such things relate to Dasein’s openness to being? 
In lecture course from the early 1930s, he argues that the natural body of Dasein is sui 
generis.  Due to freedom, Dasein stands either above or below the animal:  
Man can never be an animal, i.e. can never be nature, but is always either over the 
animal, or, precisely as human, under it (whereupon we say that man becomes ‘like an 
animal’).  Since nature does not have the inner elevation of existence which belongs to 
being-human as being out beyond oneself [Über-sich-hinaus-sein], it is incapable of 
falling. (GA 34: 236/169). 
 
This dual possibility thoroughly determines the bodily being of Dasein, which makes the body 
of Dasein differ from that of any animal.  Now, we can abstract from human freedom and 
openness to being and then the human body appears to be of the same kind as the rest of 
nature.  Heidegger cautions, however, that the abstracted human body is still not identical to 
animal bodies:  
The living body [Leib] belongs to the Dasein of man.  Being-there [Da-sein], in the 
sense of existence, is a fundamentally different way of being to that of nature.  Only 
by disregarding the specifically human character of the living human body can this 
become something analogous to nature (not nature as such, but working in like 
manner). (GA 34: 236-237/169)   
 
At the same time, Heidegger cannot avoid saying that Dasein does in fact participate in 
nature, albeit in a sui generis manner: “Nature is primordially there [da] in attunedness.  As 
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soon as man exists, through his living body he is crowded around by what is sensible and 
sensed.  This means that he bodily participates, although in his own way, as nature within the 
totality of nature” (GA 34: 237/169).  How can we relate this commonness and uniqueness? 
Heidegger’s most helpful suggestion comes in a spirited critique of National Socialist 
ideologue Erwin Kolbenheyer on January 30, 1933.  To counter Kolbenheyer’s reductive 
views, Heidegger distinguishes between bodily life as the “supporting ground” and openness 
to being as the “determining ground”:  
Even if bodily life is in a certain way the supporting ground of human Being and of 
the ethnic sequence of its generations, this still does not yet prove that the supporting 
ground also has to be the determining ground, or even that it can be (GA 36/37: 
210/160). 
 
Dasein takes up the bodily being as the supporting ground but determines it for a new end 
which thoroughly transfigures its meaning.  With this distinction, Heidegger restates the 
classical distinction between condition and cause.
10
  I think we can amplify Heidegger’s 
suggestion and his appropriation of the distinction to say the following: the meaning of our 
bodies is determined by our openness to being, yet these bodies themselves, including the 
feats of physiology, chemistry, and physics they accomplish, are conditions for our openness.  
In the same way that animality transfigures materiality even though it would not be possible 
without it, so Dasein transfigures animality even though it would not be possible without it.  
The internal organs function in identical ways to other animals, but they contribute to a whole 
whose significance is radically different.  Even basic bodily activities such as perceiving (as 
seeking to know), eating (as interpersonal dining) and reproducing (as interpersonal 
commitment) are quite different for us due to our unique way of being.  As a condition for 
10
 See Plato, Phaedo, 96a-99e, and Aristotle, Physics, II.9. The distinction between condition and cause 
recurs in Heidegger’s seminars with psychologists.  See Zollikoner Seminare: 200/155.  Paul Ricoeur (2002: 202) 
likewise employs language of condition and cause to articulate the relation of brain and thought.   
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being open to being, Dasein must be an animal, even though being open to being changes the 
meaning of animality.  In Heidegger’s terminology, while there are no ontic explanations for 
the ontological, there are yet ontic conditions for the ontological.   
How should we construe the relation between the condition and the cause?  The 
ontological changes the meaning of the ontic conditions.  To see why this is the case, consider 
the shortcoming of MacIntyre’s approach.  Though he criticizes Heidegger’s discussion of 
human difference, he does acknowledges something specifically human enabled by language.  
In his view, dolphins can have reasons for acting, but only humans can evaluate reasons for 
acting: “…the child moves beyond its initial animal state of having reasons for acting in this 
way rather than that towards its specifically human state of being able to evaluate those 
reasons, to revise them or to abandon them and replace them with others” (1991: 91 and 53-
57).  What he fails to see is that this ability to evaluate reasons changes the nature of the 
reasons.  In mature humans, reasons for acting take their bearing from the fact that they can be 
evaluated in terms of the human good.  They are not geared essentially to environmental 
goods as with non-human animals; reasons for action are situated within the context of an 
overall aim of achieving a complete life.  “Reasons for acting” in animals and humans are two 
different kinds of things, because openness to truth changes the meaning of Dasein’s animal 
inheritance.  Heidegger’s principle of wholism invites us to understand the human being as an 
integral whole in terms of openness to being rather than as a general animality to which 
something specifically human is subsequently appended.   
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Conclusion 
In the opening of the Selfish Gene, biologist Richard Dawkins (1976: 1) memorably 
writes: “Living organisms had existed on earth, without ever knowing why, for over three 
thousand million years before the truth finally dawned on one of them.  His name was Charles 
Darwin.”  Heidegger would insist on a precision: truth did not occur to Darwin because he 
was an organism.  Darwin could be Darwin because he was Dasein, open to the truth of 
things, and the truth he discovered was not an idiosyncrasy of the species, Homo sapiens.  In 
this way, Heidegger argues that the human environment, characterized by interpersonal 
meaning and truth, differs in kind from animal environments.  Heidegger rejects the view that 
humans are just another species, since such a view neglects the normativity of truth, 
something which, among other things, is a necessary presupposition for science.  However, he 
also rejects what the neurologist Antonio Damasio (1994: 249) calls “Descartes’ error,” 
namely “the abyssal separation between body and mind.”  There is no hint of substance 
dualism in Heidegger’s mature thinking on these topics.  Dasein as a whole is defined in 
reference to this openness to being and truth, and Dasein as a whole is separated from animals 
by an abyss.  I emphasized his distinction between condition and cause to do justice to our 
animal inheritance while owning up to our unique position in all of nature: we are the ones 
who can transcend biological relevance and understand the truth of things together with 
others.  On my reading, Heidegger does not wish to deny the evolution of Dasein.  Our 
mammalian frame and genetic heritage testify to the lowliness of our ancestry.  He only 
denies that it can tell us what it means to be human. 
I argued that Heidegger subscribes to the following theses: 
1. Organism and environment are reciprocally related. 
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2. The human environment is the world of meaning and truth, which is constituted by 
language. 
3. Lacking language, animals lack world. 
4. The difference between world and environment cannot be denied without making truth 
relative to human biology and without making the normativity of truth unintelligible. 
5. The whole organism determines the meaning of the part; in the case of human beings, 
openness to world determines the meaning of their bodies. 
6. The biology of the human being constitutes a condition (not a cause) for world 
openness.
11
 
11
 Many thanks to Robert Wood and several anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper. 
26 
 
References 
Bickerton, Derek. (2009) Adam’s Tongue: How Humans Made Language, How Language Made 
Humans.  New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Bloom, Paul. (2000) How Children Learn the Meanings of Words.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
 
Calarco, Matthew. (2008) Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida.  
West Sussex: Columbia University Press. 
 
Carman, Taylor. (2003) Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in 
‘Being and Time’.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Corballis, Michael. (2011) The Recursive Mind: The Origins of Human Language, Thought, and 
Civilization.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Crowell, Steven Galt. (2002) “Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest on a Mistake?  An Essay 
on Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology.” Husserl Studies 18: 123-40. 
 
________. (2013) Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dahlstrom, Daniel. (1994) “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal 
Indications,” Review of Metaphysics 47: 775-95. 
 
Damasio, Antonio. (1994) Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.  New 
York: HarperCollins. 
 
Darwin, Charles. (1952a) The Origin of Species.  In Darwin, Great Books of the Western World, 
vol. 49. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 
________. (1952b) The Descent of Man.  In Darwin, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 49. 
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 
Davidson, Donald. (2001) “Rational Animals.”  In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective.  
Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Dawkins, Richard. (1976) The Selfish Gene.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Deacon, Terrence. (1997) The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain.  
New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 
 
Denton, Michael, Govindasamy Kumaramanickavel, and Michael Legge. (2013) “Cells as 
irreducible wholes: the failure of mechanism and the possibility of an organicist revival.”  
Biology and Philosophy 28: 31-52. 
27 
 
 
Engelland, Chad.  (2012) “Disentangling Heidegger’s Transcendental Questions.” Continental 
Philosophy Review 45: 77-100. 
 
________.  (2014) Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind.  Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press. 
   
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (1998) Truth and Method, rev. ed.  Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall.  New York: Continuum. 
 
Gómez, Juan Carlos. (2004) Apes, Monkeys, Children, and the Growth of Mind.  Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Hauser, Marc D., Noam Chomsky, and W. Tecumseh Fitch. (2002) “The Faculty of Language: 
What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?” Science 298: 1569-1579. 
 
Heidegger, Martin.  GA 8.  Was Heisst Denken?, ed. Paola-Ludovika Coriando.  Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.  What Is Called Thinking?  Translated by J. Glenn 
Gray.  New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968.   
 
________.  GA 9. “Brief über den Humanismus.” In Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von 
Herrmann.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.  Letter on ‘Humanism’.  
Translated by Frank Capuzzi.  In Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
________.  GA 24.  Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von 
Herrmann.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.  The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology.  Translated by Albert Hofstadter.  Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982. 
 
________.  GA 26.  Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz.  
Gesamtausgabe, ed. Klaus Held.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.  The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  Translated by Michael Heim.  Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984.   
 
________.  GA 27.  Einleitung in die Philosophie.  Edited by Otto Saame and Ina Saame-
Speidel.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996. 
 
________.  GA 29/30.  Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik.  Edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von 
Herrmann.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.  The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics.  Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker.  Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1995. 
 
________.  GA 34.  Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.  Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet.  Edited 
by Hermann Mörchen.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.  The Essence of 
28 
 
Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus.  Translated by Ted Sadler.  London: 
Continuum, 2002. 
 
________.  GA 36/37.  Sein und Wahrheit.  Edited by Hartmut Tietjen.  Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 2001.  Being and Truth.  Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard 
Polt.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. 
 
________.  GA 40.  Einführung in die Metaphysik.  Edited by Petra Jaeger.  Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.  Introduction to Metaphysics.  Translated by Gregory Fried 
and Richard Polt.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.   
 
________.  GA 54.  Parmenides, ed. Manfred S. Frings.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1982.  Parmenides.  Translated by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. 
 
________.  GA 56/57.  Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, ed. Bernd Heimbüchel.  Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987.  Towards the Definition of Philosophy.  Translated by 
Ted Sadler.  New York: Continuum Press, 2000. 
 
________.  GA 79a, “Einblick in Das Was Ist: Bremer Vorträge 1949.”  In Bremer und 
Freiburger Vorträge, ed. Petra Jaeger.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994.  
“Insight into That Which Is: Bremen Lectures.”  In The Heidegger Reader, ed. Günter 
Figal.  Translated by Jerome Veith.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.   
 
________.  Sein und Zeit, 18th ed.  Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001.  Being and Time. 
Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.  New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1962.   
 
________.  Zollikoner Seminare, ed. Medard Boss.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1987.  Zollikon Seminars.  Edited by Medard Boss.  Translated by Franz Mayr and 
Richard Askay.  Northwestern University Press, 2001. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. (1900/2000) Logical Investigations, vol. 1.  Translated by J. N. Findlay.  
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books. 
 
________.  (1901/2000)  Logical Investigations, vo. 2. Translated by J. N. Findlay.  Amherst, 
NY: Humanity Books. 
 
Kappeler, Peter and Joan Silk, ed. (2010) Mind the Gap: Tracing the Origins of Human 
Universals.  Berlin: Springer. 
 
Kendal, Jeremy R., Jamshid J. Tehrani and John Odling-Smee, ed. (2011) “Human Niche 
Construction.” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 366. 
 
Krell, David Farrell, ed. (1993) Heidegger: Basic Writings.  New York: Harper & Row. 
 
29 
 
Lewontin, Richard. (1991) Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA.  New York: 
HarperCollins. 
 
________.  (2000) The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment.  Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press.   
 
Liszkowski, Ulf, Marie Schäfer, Malinda Carpenter, and Michael Tomasello. (2009) 
“Prelinguistic Infants, but Not Chimpanzees, Communicate About Absent Entities.”  
Psychological Science 20: 654-660. 
 
MacIntyre, Alisdair. (1999) Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues.  
Chicago: Open Court. 
 
McDowell, John. (1994) Mind and World.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
McNeill, William. (1999) “Life Beyond the Organism: Animal Being in Heidegger’s Freiburg 
Lectures, 1929-1930.”  In Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. 
Peter Steeves, pp. 197-248.  Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Mitchell, Andrew. (2001) “Heidegger’s Later Thinking of Animality: The End of World 
Poverty.” Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 1: 74-85. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1968) Will to Power.  Translated by Walter Arnold Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale.  New York: Random House. 
 
Odling-Smee, F. John, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman. (2003) Niche Construction: 
The Neglected Process in Evolution.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Penn, Derek C., Keith J. Holyoak, and Daniel J. Povinelli. (2008) “Darwin’s Mistake: Explaining 
the Discontinuity between Human and Nonhuman Minds.”  Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 31: 109-178. 
 
Ricoeur, Paul. (2000) What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue About 
Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain.  Translated by M. B. DeBevoise.  Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Searle, John. (2005) “The Phenomenological Illusion.”  In Erfahrung und Analyse, ed. Maria E. 
Reicher and Johann Christian Marek, 317-336.  Wien: ÖBV & HPT. 
 
Shockey, R. Matthew. (2010) “What’s Formal about Formal Indication? Heidegger’s Method in 
Sein und Zeit.” Inquiry 53: 525-539. 
 
Sokolowski, Robert. (2008) Phenomenology of the Human Person.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
30 
 
Stegmaier, Werner. (1987) “Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche: Zum Problem der Evolution.” 
Nietzsche-Studien 16: 264-287. 
 
Tomasello, Michael. (2003) Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language 
Acquisition.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
________.  (2008) Origins of Human Communication.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
________.  (2009) Why We Cooperate.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Uexküll, Jakob von. (1921) Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, 2d ed.  Berlin: Springer. 
 
